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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines how different ethical positions view various types of animal 
advocacy campaigns concerning a product produced using animals.  The ethical 
positions represent common company, social, and animal advocate viewpoints.  
Working in a market model with a monopolistic supplier, we determine whether the 
ethical positions support or oppose each campaign, and in what conditions.  We 
describe three easily implemented campaign strategies that combine animal welfare 
and rights goals. 
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1. Introduction 
Groups advocating animal welfare or rights often try to alter how animals are used in 
the production of goods and services including food (Compassion in World Farming, 
2014), clothing (Coalition to Abolish the Fur Trade, 2014), and entertainment (League 
against Cruel Sports, 2014).  The campaigns available for advocacy groups are many, 
as they can act on demand, supply, or regulation of those products.  For example, the 
Vegan Society (2014) urges people to avoid animal products entirely, while the 
Animal Liberation Front (2014) engages in direct action against producers and 
suppliers, and Animal Defenders International (2014) presses governments to 
introduce bans on animal use. 
 
There are also many different ethical positions for evaluating such campaigns.  
Clearly, there are differences between the interests of the advocacy groups and 
producers, but there can also be clashes with consumer and societal viewpoints.  
Among animal advocates as well there can be disagreements about objectives, with 
some groups such as the RSPCA and CIWF primarily pursuing welfare reforms rather 
than abolition of animal use and others such as People for the Ethical Treatment of 
Animals and the Animal Liberation Front working towards full abolition.  Even if 
animal advocates agree on long term goals, disagreements among animal advocates 
often extend to the campaign methods they employ, such as whether pressing for short 
term animal welfare gains is consistent with long term abolition of animal use 
(Francione, 1996; Singer, 2008; FARM, 2013).  
 
The questions addressed in this paper are as follows.  How do markets respond to 
different animal advocacy campaigns?  How do different ethical positions view each 
type of campaign?  What campaigns attract broad support while allowing advocates to 
work towards their objectives, and when are disagreements most acute? 
 
We answer these questions through several modelling steps.  We start by representing 
six ethical positions in terms of which quantity or quantities they use to evaluate 
outcomes in a market for a good that uses animals in production.  The ethical 
positions represent common company, social, and animal advocate viewpoints.  Next, 
algebraic expressions for the ethically relevant quantities are derived in terms of 
market inputs.  Then seven campaigns are characterised in terms of what inputs they 
change, and the value attached to each campaign by each ethical position is calculated 
by differentiation or discrete differencing of the ethically relevant quantities with 
respect to the campaign inputs.  The campaigns are either consumer oriented, 
technologically oriented, collaborative with companies, or direct action. 
 
Section two describes common ethical positions on animal use, section three describes 
and solves the model, section four looks at how campaigns are assessed by each 
ethical position, and section five concludes. 
 
2. Ethical positions on animal use 
In this section we present six ethical positions on the merits of animal advocacy 
campaigns.  The first two ethical positions relate to standard economic assumptions 
about the behaviour of companies (which we term “company interests”) and 
consumers (“consumer interests”), and the third allows for general public concerns 
about animal welfare (“public concern”).  The fourth ethical position takes animal 
welfare as the basis for its ethics (“animal welfare”), while the fifth (“logic of the 
larder”) takes a modified welfarist position which asserts bringing animals into 
existence is beneficial.  The final position uses animal rights as a foundation for its 
judgement (“animal rights”). 
 
Company interests 
A default assumption in economics on the operation of businesses is that they operate 
only to maximise profits.  Our first ethical position is an amoral one (with respect to 
animal welfare) that justifies such behaviour.  Its only criterion for supporting or 
opposing a campaign for changing animal use by companies is whether profits are 
increased by it.  Animal welfare and rights are irrelevant.  As globally the majority of 
chickens and pigs are raised in intensive systems (Robinson et al, 2011, pp. 54, 57) 
with low welfare, profit maximisation is plausibly the main motivation behind animal 
rearing. 
 
Consumer interests 
Economic modelling of markets commonly assumes that consumers maximise their 
own welfare (or utility) in choosing to buy a good or not.  Our second ethical position 
justifies the behaviour, and evaluates the merits of a campaign solely in terms of 
whether consumer utility is increased.  The position is not inconsistent with concern 
about animal welfare, as consumers may consider it when they are making their 
decisions.   Given the intensive systems in which most animals are raised for food, 
animal welfare does not seem to be a critical element in many purchase decisions.  
When consumers allow for animal welfare in making their decisions, they may trade-
off animal welfare against other preferences such as taste or social conformity.  For 
example, Frank (2006) presents a model in which animal discomfort reduces human 
utility and can be offset by utility derived from consumption. 
 
Animal welfare 
Our next ethical position assesses campaigns in terms of their animal welfare alone.  
The position may be supported by welfarists who see welfare as the main objective of 
reform, or by animal right advocates who see welfare reforms as an intermediate or 
more achievable outcome.  Midgley (2008) presents a welfarist position, arguing that 
society accepts the death of food animals, but not the welfare consequences of 
intensive farming.  She says that humanitarians and farmers can work together for 
welfare gains.  Similar welfarist calls for reform and inclusion of ethical concerns in 
animal use are made in Fraser (1999) and Rollin (1990).  Singer (2008) starts from a 
rights position, but argues that even if abandonment of animal use in agriculture is an 
advocate’s aim, they should support welfare improvements as abandonment will 
happen very slowly.  The animal welfare position has a strong influence on applied 
animal advocacy, through the work of welfarist groups such as the RSPCA and 
groups with ultimate animal rights aims such as People for the Ethical Treatment of 
Animals. 
 
Public concern 
The next ethical position we describe is one in which campaigns are evaluated in 
terms of their effect on buyer utility, and additionally on separate animal welfare.  
Thus, there is the potential for the campaign’s effect on animal welfare to be 
considered twice, once in the buyer’s utility function (if welfare enters it) and again 
by direct evaluation.  There are a number of reasons why such an ethical position 
might be influential.  As Cowen (2006) and Fearing and Matheny (2007) note, an 
externality arises as animal lovers suffer disutility from the poor treatment of animals 
in a market transaction in which they do not participate.  Thus, products in which 
animals are badly treated are typically underpriced under a conventional externality 
argument, and an ethical position which allows for animal welfare twice may reflect 
social preferences more closely than market pricing.  The social preferences may 
become institutionally recognised or enforced by government, who may moreover 
choose to recognise animal welfare as an explicit social good independently of buyer 
preferences.  Blackorby and Donaldson (1992) specify social value functions in which 
human and animal utilities are combined. 
 
Logic of the larder 
The ethical position termed the “logic of the larder” (Salt, 1914) proposes that animals 
derive a benefit from living, independently of any happiness or pain experienced 
during life.  So animals can enjoy a positive benefit from being created for production 
purposes even their lives are miserable.  The idea has long provenance, with Salt 
(1914) criticising versions of the position proposed in the 19th Century.   Recent 
economic models have allowed for possibility of animals deriving positive value from 
existence, among alternative positions.  The models then consider animals would be 
better not being born if the sum of their happiness from existence and welfare after 
birth is negative.  In Cowen (2006), humans can choose a minimal standard of animal 
welfare after birth below which their lives are considered not worth living.  Blackorby 
and Donaldson (1992) present a formal mathematical model where minimum lifetime 
welfare thresholds can be specified for animals and humans. 
 
Animal rights 
Our sixth ethical position evaluates campaigns in terms of the extent of animal use in 
production.  If a campaign reduces the extent of animal use, it is viewed favourably.  
Regan (1986) and Francione (1996) both propose that no matter how well animals are 
treated, animals should not be used as resources for human purposes.  Regan (1986) 
asserts that animals have a right to respect for their independent value as distinct from 
their value to others.  Francione (1996) claims that animals have the right not to be 
treated as property by humans.  He argues that advocacy should take the form of 
pushes for prohibition of aspects of animals’ property status, while avoiding 
reinforcing other aspects of that status when doing so.  We recognise that animal use 
as a measure of animal rights does not allow for advances through legal protection, 
but as the core of our working model is a market rather than legislative process, the 
measure describes the part of animal rights gains possible within this model alone. 
 
3. Model 
In this section we present our model of a market for a product which uses animals in 
production.  It consists of a monopolist company selling to a representative consumer 
who may have preferences about the welfare of animals used.  The monopolist first 
chooses the welfare for animals used in production, and then sets prices for the 
finished good.  The separation of the welfare setting decision from the pricing 
decision is also made in Ahmadi et al (2011), where only the welfare decision is 
analysed and the pricing is taken as exogenous.  In analyses of pollution with some 
similarities with our work, Cremer and Thisse (1999) and van der Made and 
Schoonbeek (2009) separate the choice of polluting technology from that pricing. 
 
We solve the model for profits, consumer utility, animal welfare, and numbers of 
animals killed.   Changes in these quantities determine how campaigns are viewed in 
each of the ethical positions described in section two.  In the next section we consider 
how various actual campaigns alter the quantities. 
 
3.1 Specification 
A profit maximising company produces a good using animals and other inputs.  The 
company is assumed to face no competitors (analysis of a competitive market is 
discussed in the conclusion).  Each unit of the good produced is associated with the 
death of one animal in production (the nature of the results is not sensitive to the 
number of animals killed and the assumption makes for clearer algebra). 
 
Each unit of the good is produced at a cost attributable to two components.  The first 
component relates to how well the animals are treated in production, and rises in 
proportion to the square of their welfare.  Welfare is measured by a single scalar 
quantity w.  Animal welfare has multiple dimensions and interpretation (Broom, 
1991), and some of the dimensions not be readily comparable or may be unrelated 
(Hubbard and Scott, 2011; Ingemann et al, 2009).  However, we translate from 
humans to animals the standard economic practice in using a scalar measure to 
evaluate welfare, thereby following Blackorby and Donaldson (1992).  The second 
component of cost relates to all other inputs of production and is a constant value a.  
Thus, total costs are 
 
)( 2bwaq +          (1) 
 
where q is quantity sold and b is a constant. 
 
A representative consumer derives utility from consuming the good, subject to 
declining marginal utility described by a quadratic curve.  They derive increased 
utility from better animal welfare when the good is produced, with constant marginal 
utility.  The consumer also gets a constant marginal utility normalised at one from 
consumption of a basket of other goods, whose quantity is measured by G.  Thus, 
their utility U is given by 
 
GewqdqcqU ++−= 2
2
1
       (2) 
 
for constants c, d, and e. 
 
Representative consumer models are standard in the industrial economics literature 
(Belleflamme and Peitz, 2010, chapter 5), and have been used to calculate jointly 
price and endogenous pollution levels in an industry (Stathopoulou, 2014).  However, 
we also experimented with various specifications with consumer heterogeneity, rather 
than a representative consumer model.  One specification followed van der Made and 
Schoonbeek’s (2009) model of pollution valuation, having heterogeneity only in 
consumer valuation of the merits of welfare.   This specification resulted in companies 
choosing to have either the minimum or maximum possible welfare levels, which did 
not give informative results when we calculated marginal effects of campaigns.  
Another specification had heterogeneity in valuation both of welfare and the other 
features of the good.  The company optimisation did not lead to compact algebraic 
solutions as given in the main part of this paper.  We prefer here to work with explicit 
solutions rather than opt for numerical analysis. 
 
The representative consumer has a budget of M, a constant.  The price of the good is p 
and the price of the basket of other goods is normalised at one, so that the budget 
constraint is 
 
GpqM += .         (3) 
 
3.2 Solution 
We first solve for the representative consumer’s demand for the good at any price p 
and welfare w.  The consumer’s utility U in equation 2 given the budget constraint in 
equation 3 is 
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2
1
.       (4) 
 
Differentiating with respect to q, setting the result equal to zero, and solving for q 
gives 
 
dpewcq /)( −+= . 
 
The company earns a net income per sale of 
 
2bwap −− . 
 
Its profits Π when price is p and welfare is w are given by (up to a scaling constant to 
allow for population size) 
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We change variables from p to x under the substitution xewp −= .  The profits are 
then 
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Since the second bracket is the quantity sold, it is positive and the expression is 
minimised when 
b
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The optimum is obtained at 
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At the solved values of p and w, profits are given by 
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As described in section two, changes in profits are the basis of evaluating advocacy 
campaigns in the ethical position we term company interests. 
 
Consumer utility is given by 
 
db
acbeMU 2
22
128
))(4( −+
+= . 
 
Total consumer utility and average per person utility are both maximised together as 
the population size is not endogenous in the system, and we can consider only per 
person utility U in determining utility changes.  Changes in utility are how campaigns 
are evaluated in the ethical position termed consumer interests. 
 
Welfare is given by 
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Changes in welfare are how campaigns are evaluated in the ethical position described 
here as animal welfare. 
 
The quantity given by the sum of utility and animal welfare is 
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Changes in this quantity are how we evaluate advocacy campaigns in the ethical 
position termed here as public concern.  The main variable of concern is constructed 
by direct addition of utility and welfare, and alternative combinations of the two could 
be made in an unlimited number of ways.  Direct addition has the advantages of being 
a simple and intuitively reasonable representation of how people or society may 
combine them (in the absence of any detailed econometric evidence) and leading to 
relatively transparent results without incursion from superfluous parameters. 
 
The number of animals killed is 
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Changes in the number of animals killed are taken as the basis for evaluating 
campaign performance in the ethical position we term animal rights.  The idea of 
selecting this quantity as the basis of evaluation is that among the variables in our 
model it best measures the extent to which the right not to be used in production is 
violated. 
 
The total aggregated welfare is given by 
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Changes in this quantity form the basis of evaluating campaigns in the ethical position 
termed here the logic of the larder.  The idea is to reflect the position’s idea that 
additional animal life is good, separately from the welfare in which those animals live 
their lives.  Total welfare gives one possible combination of quantity and quality of 
animal life.  There are other ways for a “logic of the larder” position to evaluate 
campaigns.  For example, a positive constant could be added to welfare per animal 
which would represent the additional value that the position attaches to animal life.  
The measure used here offers a plausible representation of the position and is 
parametrically parsimonious. 
 
We now have algebraic expressions for several variables that are relevant to the 
ethical positions described in section 2.  These ethically relevant variables are profits 
(Π), utility (U), welfare (w), the sum of utility and social welfare (U + w), the quantity 
of animals killed (q), and total aggregated welfare (wq). 
 4. Campaigns 
In this section, we consider seven types of campaigns that have been adopted by 
animal advocacy groups.  Two of the campaigns are consumer oriented (raising 
consumer awareness, and boycott), one is technological (facilitating the introduction 
of new welfare-enhancing technology), two are collaborative (negotiation on welfare 
practices, and praise of reforming companies), and two are direct action (targeted 
direct action against low welfare standards, and general direct action).  Our goal is to 
see how these campaigns affect quantities of interest to each ethical position.  The 
ethical positions were described in section two, and the ethically relevant quantities 
were derived in algebraic form in section three.  The approach adopted is to 
characterise campaigns as changing input variables to the market model in section 
four, and then differentiate or finite difference the ethically relevant quantities with 
respect to these variables.  The sign and magnitude of the derivative or difference then 
show how campaigns are evaluated within and between ethical positions. 
 
4.1 Consumer awareness 
Advocacy groups have often tried to raise consumer awareness about the welfare of 
animals used in production processes.  Some campaigns have given information about 
standard practices in animal use (Compassion in World Farming, 2007; Pig-vision, 
2014), while others detail abuses committed in them (Mercy for Animals, 2014).  We 
consider a campaign type that increases the awareness of consumers of animal welfare 
standards in production processes.  We model its effect as an increase in the 
parameter e in the consumer utility function, which represents the valuation of welfare.  
We can see the effect of the campaign by differentiation of profits Π with respect to e, 
which gives 
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Differentiation of utility per person U with respect to e gives 
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 When welfare per animal w is differentiated with respect to e, the result is 
 
bde
dw
2
1
= . 
 
The result of differentiating utility per person plus welfare per animal, U + w, with 
respect to e is 
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The derivative of the number of animals killed q with respect to e is 
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Differentiating total welfare, wq, across animals with respect to e yields 
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Frank (2006) notes that increasing sensitivity to welfare conditions may have an 
ambiguous effect on utility.   One of the mechanisms he highlights is that people’s 
awareness of poor conditions may reduce their utility from consumption of a good, 
and restoring the initial utility from consumption by purchasing a good with better 
welfare conditions is costly, so that utility from alternative uses of the money is lost.  
Thus, utility may be reduced by better information about welfare.  In our model, 
increased sensitivity to welfare issues is an opportunity for people to gain more utility 
by buying goods with higher welfare standards.  Frank (2006) notes this possibility by 
observing that people may get a “warm glow” from switching behaviour.  Our model 
can derive the same results as Frank (2006) if we reduce utility by a large enough 
constant at the same time as we increase sensitivity to the welfare variable, so that 
buying higher welfare goods reduces utility loss rather than increasing utility relative 
to the starting level.  We shall see in the next section that a reduction in consumption 
utility is associated with a decline in the quantity sold while leaving welfare 
unchanged.  The reduction in consumption utility coupled with an increased 
sensitivity to welfare would represent a campaign in which consumers are told that 
low welfare is bad, rather than high welfare is good.  Such a campaign may appeal to 
both animal welfare and animal rights advocates. 
 
4.2 Strict boycott 
Sometimes advocacy groups represent a product or services as inherently bad, rather 
than bad primarily as a result of welfare practices that can be reformed.  The groups 
then urge a total boycott of the product.  Boycotts have been urged in products and 
services including meat and animal products used as food (Vegan Society, 2014; 
Animal Aid, 2014), circuses using animals (Animal Defenders International, 2014), 
animal experimentation (British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection, 2014), and 
fur (Coalition to Abolish the Fur Trade, 2014). 
 
We consider a campaign type that portrays a product as malign and urges a boycott.  
The campaign’s effect is modelled as a reduction in the parameter c in the consumer 
utility function, which represents the linear component of utility derived from 
consumption.  Differentiation of profits Π with respect to minus c gives 
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The derivatives of the remaining ethically relevant quantities are 
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4.3 New technology 
Campaigns by advocacy groups may attempt to promote new technology with higher 
welfare standards than presently employed in an industry.  The campaigns may 
support the introduction of technologies that improve the welfare of animals currently 
used in production rather than replacing them entirely, for instance by providing 
information about the technology and reducing company uncertainty about its 
viability.  As an example, the Humane Society of the United States (2011) provided a 
review of research literature on the economics of gestation crates and alternative 
systems of pig housing.  Their technical information argues for the suitability and 
financial viability of the alternative systems.  Campaigns for controlled atmosphere 
killing of chickens in replacement for mechanical neck cutting (People for the Ethical 
Treatment of Animals, 2014) are another example. 
 
Our next campaign type tries to develop or introduce technology that increases 
welfare for animals without replacing them in the production process.  Such 
campaigns act to make adoption easier, by reducing the cost or perceived cost of 
adopting the technology.  The effect of the campaigns is represented by a reduction in 
the welfare cost variable b. 
 
The derivatives of the ethically relevant quantities are 
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4.4 Negotiation on practices 
Advocacy groups may reach an agreement with a company to improve the welfare 
standard used in production.  Examples include the PETA agreement with Wendy’s 
(People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 2014) and the PETA and HSUS 
agreement with Burger King (New York Times, 2007).  Negotiation may be backed 
up with other forms of influence like boycotts, but after the negotiations are 
concluded and permanent welfare reform is agreed, the other forms generally stop. 
 
Our fourth campaign type involves negotiations between the advocacy group and the 
company, resulting in an increase in welfare above the free market level.  The effect 
of the campaign is modelled by fixing welfare at an exogenous level above the free 
market rate of bew 2/= .  w is no longer determined endogenously, so we have to 
revise the pricing calculation. 
 From equation 5, the profits are 
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Instead of optimising over welfare w and price p, the company agrees w exogenously 
and then decides on p to maximise profits.  By quadratic optimisation, the maximising 
solution in p and the ethically relevant variables are 
 
2
2 acewbwp +++= , 
 
d
acewbw
4
)( 22 +−−
=Π ,       (7) 
 
d
acewbwMU
8
)( 22 +−−
+= , 
 
ww = , 
 
w
d
acewbwMwU ++−−+=+
8
)( 22
, 
 
d
ewbwacq
2
2 +−−
= , 
 
and 
 
d
ewbwacw
wq
2
)( 2 +−−
= . 
 
For a non-negative quantity, the value of w must be less than the second root of the 
equation 02 =+−− ewbwac , or 
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We can see the effect of the campaign by differentiation of profits Π with respect to w, 
which gives 
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Since bew 2/> , the first bracket is positive.  At bew 2/=  the second bracket is 
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 and ac > .  Thus, profits decline as 
welfare increases from bew 2/= .  The rate of growth remains negative, since the 
value of the second bracket is negative over values of w that have a non-negative 
quantity sold.  Thus, the campaign always reduces profits. 
 
The derivative of utility per person U with respect to w is 
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Welfare w is differentiated with respect to w giving unity: 
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Differentiating utility per person plus welfare per animal, U + w, with respect to w, 
we have 
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The sign is ambiguous, depending on whether the first additive term on the right hand 
side is greater or less than minus one. 
 The derivative of the number of animals killed q with respect to w is 
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while the derivative of total welfare, wq, across animals with respect to w is 
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At bew 2/=  the derivative is  
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so that total welfare initially rises as w increases beyond be 2/ .  The derivative 
becomes negative when 
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> .  Given the restriction on w given by 
equation 8 to ensure a positive quantity, the region of w with total welfare declining as 
w increases is where  
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is equivalent to 
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 and the terms on the left hand side exceed the corresponding terms on the right hand 
side.  Thus, total welfare initially increases and then declines as welfare increases. 
 
4.5 Praise for reform 
Advocacy groups sometimes praise companies for introducing welfare reforms.  The 
praise can be perfunctory, or more substantial and include the right to use certification 
provided by the advocacy group.  Such certifications include the American Humane 
Association’s Humane Heartland and the RSPCA’s Freedom Food.  The certifications 
offer the company the chance to attract new consumers who would otherwise be 
reluctant to consume the good. 
 
We examine the effect of a campaign in which an advocacy group offers a company a 
valuable commendation in exchange for increasing their animal welfare standards.  
The campaign is modelled as an exogenous increase in the welfare parameter w as in 
section 4.4 and a simultaneous increase in the parameter c measuring utility of 
consuming the good, so that total profits are left unchanged at a constant F.  From 
equation 7, profits are 
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For any welfare level w, the solution in c is 
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where we exclude the second solution as the implied quantity sold is negative. 
 
The maximising solution in p and the ethically relevant variables are 
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Utility and quantity are independent of welfare, conditional on the profits, as seen in 
section 4.4. 
 
It follows that the derivatives of the ethically relevant quantities are 
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4.6 Targeted direct action against low welfare 
Some campaigns take the form of direct action against a company whose welfare 
levels are considered too low by the advocacy group.  The actions may consist of 
property damage, blockades, disruption, and intimidation.  An example of such a 
campaign is from the Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC, 2014) action against 
the animal testing company Huntingdon Life Sciences (HLS).  Although SHAC is 
plausibly mainly driven by dislike of the general nature of HLS’s work, their website 
explicitly mentions welfare abuses and legal violations, and pesticide and household 
product testing, so we regard the severity of their campaign is partially motivated by 
perceived low welfare standards at HLS. 
 
Our sixth campaign type involves direct action against a company in response to low 
welfare standards.  The model is that the direct action causes damage or disruption to 
the company in proportion to the gap between the actual welfare and the level deemed 
minimally acceptable by the advocacy group, and so increases costs for the company 
in proportion to the gap.  The campaigns’ effect is represented as an increased cost per 
unit of )0,max( wW − , where W is the group’s minimally acceptable welfare. W is no 
less than the market value of w, so )2/( beW ≥ .  Thus, the unit cost of production is 
)0,max(2 wWbwa −++ . 
 
The problem solved by the company is to maximise the profit function of 
 
dpewcwWbwap /)))(0,max(( 2 −+−−−−=Π  
 
For Ww > , the profit function becomes 
 dpewcbwap /))(( 2 −+−−=Π  
 
and since )2/( beWw ≥>  which is the market value of welfare, it is optimal to 
reduce w to W or lower.  If Ww ≤ then the profit function is 
 
dpewcwWbwap /))(( 2 −++−−−=Π      (9) 
 
which has a welfare solution of 
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If 
b
eW
2
1+
≤ , the solution is Ww = .  Thus, we can distinguish two cases: 
b
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2
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≤  
and 
b
eW
2
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> .  In the first case, the advocacy group makes limited welfare demands 
on the company, and the company solves 
 
dpeWcbWap /))(( 2 −+−−=Π . 
 
The problem is then the same as for negotiation on practices in section 4.4 with w 
replaced by W, with the same solutions.  In the second case, the advocacy group’s 
welfare demands are larger, and the company maximises profits from equation 9, with 
solution 
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Animal welfare therefore increases.  Profits are 
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Consumer utility is 
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The sum of utility and welfare is 
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Total welfare is 
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The number of animals killed is 
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Since 
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> , from equation 11 we have 
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which is less than the number of animals killed in the absence of the campaign,  
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8
)(42 −+
 (from equation 6).   It follows that the campaign reduces the number 
of animals killed. 
 
To ensure a non-negative quantity sold, 0
8
)(412
>
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.  Then from equation 
10 and using 
b
eW
2
1+
>  again we have 
 
db
beacbe
2
22
64
)))2/()1((4)1(( +−−++
<Π  
 
or 
 
db
acbe
2
22
64
))(41( −+−
<Π  
 
which is less than 
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.  Thus, the campaign results in a decline in corporate profits.  
Similarly, we deduce that the campaign reduces consumer utility.  As welfare rises 
while utility declines, the effect on their sum is ambiguous, and the same is true for 
total welfare as the product of the rising welfare and declining quantity. 
 
4.7 General direct action against the company 
Advocacy groups may engage in direct action because of the nature of the good or 
service produced, rather than because of the specific welfare standards in production.  
An example of such a campaign is the smashing of an organic butcher’s windows 
described by the Animal Liberation Front Press Office (2014), with an activist stating 
that the target was chosen because it sells meat, irrespective of its welfare standards. 
 
The seventh campaign type we consider consists of direct action against a company, 
independent of the welfare standards it has.  It is modelled by an increase in the cost 
of production parameter a.  We can see the effect of the campaign by differentiation 
of the ethically relevant quantities: 
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Inspecting the solutions here and comparing them with those in section 4.2, we see 
that the market outcomes of general direct action are the same as for a boycott.  The 
reason is that in our monopolistic market model, the effect of changes in the utility 
parameter c and the cost parameter a are equal and opposite in effect on market 
outcomes, as we can see from the outcome equations in section 3.2. 
 
4.8 Summary of campaign preferences 
Table 1: The benefits or losses from campaigns, viewed from different ethical 
positions 
 Campaign 
 Consumer oriented Tech. Collaborative Direct action 
Ethical 
basis 
Consumer 
awareness Boycott 
Welfare 
tech. Negotiation 
Reform 
praise 
Targeted 
action 
General 
action 
Company 
interests + - + - 0 - - 
        
Consumer 
interests + - + - 0 - - 
        
Animal 
welfare + 0 + + + + 0 
        
Public 
concern 
+ - + ? + ? - 
        
Animal 
rights - + - + 0 + + 
        
Logic of 
the larder + - + ? + ? - 
Notes: + means a benefit is perceived.  – means a loss is perceived.  0 means neither a benefit or loss is 
perceived.  ? means the perception of the outcome depends on market conditions. 
 
Table 1 summarises our findings of how the different ethical positions benefit or lose 
from each campaign.  The campaign aimed at raising consumer awareness issues is 
favoured by all ethical positions except animal rights.  The reason is that the 
campaign as it is framed makes animal welfare an additional consumer benefit that 
can be acquired by buying the product in a form with higher welfare standards.  So 
the product can be more attractive than before.  The company sells the higher welfare 
product, and so sales, utility, and profits increase. 
 
The boycott campaign causes losses to four of the perspectives, namely company 
interests, consumer interests, public concern, and logic of the larder.  The product 
becomes less attractive, so consumers derive less benefit from buying it, and sales and 
profits reduce.  As the campaign targets any animal usage regardless of the intensity 
of welfare standards, the company does not adjust the welfare of animals used.  The 
reduction in animals killed is appealing from an animal rights position. 
 
The campaign to promote the use of higher welfare technology is viewed positively 
from all ethical positions except animal rights.  The campaign makes products with 
higher welfare more affordable, and it is optimal for the company to bring higher 
welfare goods to market.  Profits and utility increase, as does the quantity of animals 
killed. 
 
The campaign of negotiation of higher welfare brings losses to the ethical positions of 
company interests and consumer interests.  The campaign increases welfare above the 
profit maximising level.  With the pricing choices of the company, the consumer 
utility also falls and so does the quantity sold.  Because of the welfare increase and 
quantity decline, the campaign brings benefits in the ethical positions of animal 
welfare and animal rights but may bring benefits or losses from the logic of the larder 
position depending on market conditions.  From the viewpoint of public concern, the 
outcomes are again ambiguous. 
 
The campaign of praising a company that introduces welfare reforms is viewed 
neutrally by the company interests and consumer interests viewpoints.  The campaign 
is designed to be neutral with respect to profits, and so leaves consumer utility 
unchanged.  The campaign increases welfare and is viewed favourably from animal 
welfare and public concern positions.  Under monopoly pricing, changes in the 
exogenous welfare and linear component of consumer utility leave the quantities of 
animals killed unchanged, conditional on the profits.  Thus, the campaign is neutral 
from an animal rights perspective as well.  The logic of the larder position views the 
campaign positively because of the welfare increase and constant number of animals 
killed. 
 
The campaign of targeted action against low welfare standards causes losses in the 
company interests and consumer interests ethical positions.  The campaign reduces 
the value and utility of any sale, with the company able to offset the declines only 
partially by increasing welfare.  An animal welfare position evaluates the campaign 
positively.  The changes are associated with reduced numbers of animals killed, so the 
campaign is also evaluated positively by the animal rights position.  For the public 
concern and logic of the larder positions, the offsetting movements of their constituent 
elements make their evaluation of the campaign ambiguous. 
 
The campaign of general direct action against the company is viewed negatively from 
company interests and consumer interests ethical positions.  Costs increase, reducing 
profits and utility.  The campaign is neutral from an animal welfare position.  Because 
the severity of the campaign is not mitigated by raising welfare standards, no welfare 
changes occur.  From an animal rights viewpoint, the decline in the number of 
animals killed means the campaign is considered beneficial.  The public concern and 
logic of the larder positions view the campaign negatively. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper has examined how different ethical positions view animal advocacy 
campaigns in respect of goods produced using animals.  The positions were 
characterised as taking an interest in various outcomes in the market.  The market 
model was of monopolistic supply and representative consumers, with campaigns 
acting through their effect on supply and demand, and the market mechanism.  We 
summarised our results in a table showing where the ethical positions support or 
oppose campaigns, and in what conditions. 
 
The work suggests a number of campaign strategies allowing advocates to 
simultaneously work towards welfare and rights goals when dealing with a 
monopolistic supplier.  Firstly, both negotiation and targeted action can offer welfare 
and rights gains.  However, consumers may be hostile to the changes, leading to 
potentially temporary gains unless a secondary campaign is launched to influence 
public opinion.  Secondly, a campaign that says low welfare standards are bad and a 
campaign that says high welfare standards are good can both increase welfare, but 
only the former decreases total animal use.  Thirdly, direct action campaigns that 
target companies can achieve welfare gains as well as reducing animal use if 
campaign intensity partially reduces when welfare standards rise.  The campaigns 
would then also attract more support from beyond animal advocates. 
 
There are a number of assumption changes or extensions that could be made to 
increase understanding of the impact of campaigns.  The representative consumer 
model could be given fuller foundations based on consumer heterogeneity in 
valuations of both welfare and non-welfare characteristics of the good.  As we noted 
in the main text, we did not do so here because the resulting optimisation problem 
faced by the company did not give compact algebraic solutions.  As a result, 
numerical techniques may be required to determine outcomes. 
 
Another extension relates to the introduction of government.  In our model, 
campaigns act through directly changing market outcomes.  The government sector 
could be introduced to allow for lobbying (as in Heyes and Liston-Heyes’ (2005) 
analysis of the form of environmental lobbying) or taxes and subsidies (see Cowen 
(2006)).  The analysis could remain economic under a public choice or law and 
economics approach. 
 
We analysed a limited range of campaigns, and other campaigns could be examined in 
future work.  These could be variants on the ones studied here, or entirely novel ones.  
A potentially informative departure could how institutional arrangements affect 
markets outcomes, such as whether animals are treated as property (Francione, 1996). 
 
The model assumes that the company is monopolistic.  An alternative would be to 
assume a competitive market where price is set equal to cost, so that 2bwap += .  
The price can be substituted in the expression for utility given by equation 4, and the 
welfare solved to maximise utility.  The solution in w is independent of q, and is 
)2/( bew = , as in the monopolistic case.  It follows that )4/(2 beap += .  The rest of 
the analysis follows as described in earlier sections.  We do not present the results 
here. 
 
The paper indicates that all the ethical positions have a choice of campaigns to 
achieve their aims.  A development that may be helpful to advocacy groups would be 
to determine their optimal portfolio of campaigns.  One element of such an analysis 
would be the extent of output response to changes in input variables, which we have 
already stated in algebraic terms.  Parameters could be replaced with their values 
estimated from econometric studies to give actual market responses.  Other elements 
of an optimal portfolio analysis would be the extent of response of input variables to 
advocacy group activity, and budgeting.  There is precedent for analysis of optimal 
welfare choices (from a company perspective of increasing profitability) in Ahmadi et 
al (2011). 
 
We have not modelled how companies may respond to campaigns beyond adjustment 
of price and welfare levels.  In practice, targets in advocacy campaigns may respond 
by attempting to adjust other characteristics of the market such as market demand 
(Jasper and Poulsen, 1993).  The optimal sequence of responses and counter-
responses could be analysed in future work, perhaps in a game theoretic setting.  The 
different welfare valuations of the various ethical positions would then correspond to 
different games being played, with possibly clashing strategies and equilibria. 
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